

WHITHER CHINA
AND
EAST ASIA?



Ch'en Shou-yi

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BY

Dr. Ch'en Shou-yi

Professor of Chinese Culture,
Pomona College and Claremont Graduate School

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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, now that the capitulation of the Japanese Empire is already an accomplished fact, it is fitting and proper that we direct our attention to the vast area of East Asia recently freed from the domination and menace of the aggressors. On the other side of the Pacific, over a billion people are trying to bring about changes and make adjustments, hoping, praying, and working for a better day. Problems old and new that are clamoring for solution are numerous. Tasks that remain to be done are legion. In certain areas, just as the enemy was laying down his arms, there came shooting of another sort—auguring the possibilities of internal strife here and there. Conflicting reports and interpretations from abroad claim our attention and confuse our judgment. American correspondents, handicapped by the difficulty of languages with which they are not familiar, supply us with ample reports but add little to our power of understanding. The bewilderment is so great that Representative Mansfield from Montana has demanded an explanation of American policies and actions in China.

It was probably in view of this situation that Mr. Robert J. Bernard suggested to me the other day to make my talk “informational” by which I took it to mean that I should avoid a recital of bare facts on the one hand and rehashing of official Chinese propaganda on the other. By way of response I propose to deal not only with the new patterns that are to emerge in East Asia but also with the general direction in which future changes in the light of past events are most likely to evolve. I

fully realize I am not quite equal to the task, but I will try to perform it to the best of my ability.

The area in East Asia that claims our foremost attention today is China, not only because of her large population and her vast territory, but also because of the new significance she has acquired through her eight long years of bitter resistance against Japanese aggression. Although we would hesitate to accept Mr. Owen Lattimore's prophecy that the next hundred years may well be the Chinese century, yet we would feel skeptical about Colonel McCormick's recent pronouncement that China is an amorphous mass of people rather than a unified nation. Without enumerating the attributes of nationhood, we know that a people who has maintained a continuous cultural tradition for four thousand years is more than a mere amorphous mass; that a people who can hold a powerful enemy at bay against great odds is certainly more than an amorphous mass. A denial of nationhood to the Chinese people at this age is absolutely unjustifiable.

And yet it is common knowledge that China is not, and probably will never be a superpower in the sense that the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom are superpowers. To some people, China is entitled to her place among the big four and the big five on account of her potentialities rather than her actualities. With this point of view, no intelligent Chinese would argue. In fact, President Chiang Kai-Shek himself frankly admitted in his V-J Day address to the Chinese nation that "our foundation as a modern state is the weakest among the United Nations."

It is from the humble beginnings of such a weak foundation that China will now undertake to rebuild the nation. The work is difficult because the problems are many, impediments are great, and progress will be slow. Quoting Chiang Kai-Shek again "The enemy's imperialistic designs on China have been thoroughly crushed. But relaxation and pride are not rewards of victory that we seek. Peace, when fighting ceases, will confront us with stupendous tasks, demanding greater strength and sacrifice than the years of war. At times we may feel that

the problems of peace that descend upon us are even more trying than those we met during the war."

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China's greatest problem today, a problem which worries the patriots at home and her friends abroad, is the central one of national unity. Whither China? Toward national unity and solidarity, or another era of civil war and political division? This is discussed by the American press and radio as the Nationalist and Communist deadlock in their struggle for power. Despite the amount of dramatization given the issue by correspondents and commentators, one often finds it difficult on this side of the Pacific to understand the real issues at stake and to formulate opinions as to a possible solution. It is difficult because reporting has been highly colored by subjective interpretation and partisan views, and presented without the benefit of the backdrop of the recent history of China. Under the circumstances, it is no wonder that by some writers the Chinese Communists have been praised to the sky as the only democratic force at work in China, interested only in fighting the Japanese and in agrarian reforms, and having nothing to do with Moscow or the Third International even before its formal dissolution; while by other writers, they are denounced as the worst political opportunists, taking advantage of the war to seize power.

In order to size up the complex situation we must bear in mind the following facts:

1. That the antagonism between the two parties has been of many years' standing. Following five years of coalition (1922-27) were ten years of open strife until the formulation of the United Front in 1937.

2. That inasmuch as the Nationalists and the Communists can claim only a membership of five million and two and a half million respectively they both are really minority parties.

3. That beside these two parties there are other parties such as the State Socialist Party, the Young China Party, and

large numbers of the independent liberals with no party affiliations.

4. That there are radical, conservative and moderate wings among both the Nationalists and Communists.

5. That as the Nationalist party has been the party in power during the eight years of war against Japan, it has had to face and tackle many more problems than the Communist party, and its shortcomings have been more readily revealed.

6. That as the visits of American correspondents to the Communist areas were in the nature of conducted tours, while their residence in the rest of free China gave them access to all aspects of the political and economic scene, their comparisons of the two areas are often unbalanced and therefore not entirely reliable.

7. That the Communists have maintained a separate army, expanded it beyond the size agreed upon in 1937, and used it to capture towns and cities in the interest of the party after the capitulation of Japan.

8. That the Chinese Communists are not different from ordinary Communists elsewhere in their ideology, except that they avow allegiance to the three People's Principles of Sun Yat-Sen, founder of the Chinese Republic.

It would be pointless with the limited time at our disposal this evening to review the many attempts at negotiation between the Central government and the Communist party during the last few years. The negotiations were broken off time and again because as soon as the Government decided to make concessions the Communists would immediately step up their demands. Thus, while gaining ground gradually in propaganda in this country, the Chinese Communists rapidly lost a good deal of the support and sympathy of Chinese liberals at home. To the people of China at large the problem has come to mean not only a mere controversy between the two strongest parties but also the insubordination of a state within a state.

To make a long story short, an interim solution is already in sight and its general workability seems unquestioned. Legal status has already been granted by the National government

to the Communist Party as well as to other minor political parties making up the Democratic League. Likewise a coalition cabinet will result with ministry posts open to Communists and members of other parties. To avoid the tragedy of a civil war the Government has even agreed to the temporary continuation of the Communist administration in the Northwestern Border Area, commonly referred to as Red China, as well as the continuation of the Communist Army at state expense. Other differences between the Government and the Communists will be ironed out by a special committee to be composed equally of Nationalists, Communists, members of the Democratic League, and independent liberals. Such basic issues as the Communist challenge that the Government has no evidence of a mandate from the people and the question of the disposition of the Communist Army will have to await the decision of the people following the general election of this November.

Civil war in China has thus been averted at least for the time being, thanks to the forbearance and liberal leadership in the Central Government. The greatest factor working for unification, of course, has been the intense desire of the people for internal peace. In the eyes of the Chinese people, as one writer puts it, "any one who fires the first shot for civil war in China will bear the stigma of a criminal for a thousand years." Large measures of credit are also due to the cooperation of the United States government and the non-interference policy of the government of the Soviet Union. How Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer have exerted themselves to bring about the rapprochement between the Nationalists and Communists, how American marines have taken over control of important coastal cities from the surrendering Japanese, how the American Air Force has cooperated with the Chinese high command in the redeployment of Chinese troops, are well known in this country. What remains to be underscored is the stabilizing effect of the non-interference policy announced by the Soviet Union.

On the eve of the signing of the Sino-Russian Treaty of

Friendship and Alliance, there were signs in China that the Communists were making capital of Japan's capitulation to get out of bounds. They were surrounding such key cities as Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking and Shanghai with large numbers of troops and partisan fighters ready for action. They were accusing Chiang of high treason and their American sympathizers were labelling the Chungking government as a dictatorial, reactionary and feudal regime — a deadly enemy of democracy in China. Then came the Soviet announcement that the U.S.S.R. was "ready to render China moral support and assistance with military equipment and other material resources — this support and assistance to be given fully to the National Government as the Central Government of China." The following day, the Chinese Communist press paid tribute to President Chiang and dropped the appellation of arch traitor. It is no wonder that even to the editor of *Life*, this sudden reversal had the effect of "something new under the sun."

More recently the trend toward national unification was further strengthened by another event of some importance in China. I refer to the removal of General Lung Yün from the governorship of Yünnan Province of which Kunming, the northern terminus of the Burma Road and Stillwell Road, is the capital city. General Lung, who has amassed considerable private military power and wealth, may be regarded as the last war-lord of China and his transference to a nominal post is a significant check against the resurgence of war-lordism.

Thus we can discern clearly the trend toward national solidarity and unity in China.

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Unity though desirable in itself, does not necessarily guarantee the welfare of the common people. In fact, according to the false accusations of American leftists, Chungking has resorted to the threat of armed force in bringing about unification so as to pave the way for dictatorial control by Chinese

fascists. The next logical question with which we should concern ourselves this evening is whether China is moving toward dictatorial control or democracy.

To answer this question effectively, we must take stock of the strength of the democratic tradition in Chinese history. China's long annals reveal the following meaningful facts:

1. Feudalism disappeared from China as early as the third century B. C., giving place to a democratized social structure under which the system of primogeniture was abolished, and wealth and landed property were equitably distributed, making possible a remarkable degree of social fluidity and wiping out class distinction.

2. China has had for the last 2,000 years an objective, competitive system of examinations for the civil service with equal opportunities for all.

3. Through the centuries the Chinese government succeeded in creating its own opposition in the form of a board of censors who dared to criticize even the monarchs themselves.

4. Mencius' full development in the fourth century of the theories of the right of rebellion and the superiority of the people to the king in political importance has never been contradicted or even challenged by any later philosopher.

5. There has been a long recognition of the principle of equality before the law. "If a prince violate the law he shall receive the same penalty as the common people."

These, coupled with the tradition of local self-government for many centuries, prepared the Chinese people for the important political change of 1911 which saw the establishment of the first republic by a non-Caucasian people. But the possession of "democraticness" in national life does not necessarily mean the ability to set up and operate the complex machinery of a modern political democracy. It was probably in recognition of this difference that Dr. Goodnow of Johns Hopkins, when he went to China in 1915 as high advisor to the Peking government, advised, with the best of intentions, that an enlightened monarchy might be better able to mobilize the masses for progress. It was certainly in recognition of the

same situation that Dr. Sun Yat-Sen propounded the necessity of a transitional period of political tutelage by the Nationalist Party before the supreme political powers could be safely returned to the people. The failure to provide this tutelage in the early years of the Republic gave rise to such political backsliding as internal strife between war-lords to the disgust of the culturally united but politically powerless people and the various attempts at restoration of the monarchy. Despite these signs of retrogression, it was apparent even in those years, that China was going forward toward the democracy to which she had committed herself.

When Japan struck on a larger scale in 1937, the ten-year period of the National party's tutelage was coming to a close and political sovereignty was about to be returned to the people. The war of resistance has delayed China's progress in every sphere of activity including the proclamation of the Constitution and the holding of the general election. Meanwhile, wartime emergency was to produce its bad effect on the Chinese political scene. Not only were personal liberties curtailed by such justifiable measures as the establishment of censorship and the prevention of subversive activities by agencies equivalent to the American F.B.I.; actually power cliques within the Nationalist Party tried to disseminate reactionism and interfered with the effective running of democratic machinery. Conservatives like the brothers Chen Lifu and Chen Kuo-fu in their desperate struggle for power, went as far as attempting a regimentation and control of thinking, justly provoking a storm of protest from intellectual leaders in this country. Thanks to the endeavors of the liberals in the government and the Nationalist Party, the reactionaries have been held in check if not thoroughly discredited.

But even during the years of war the picture was not as hopelessly dark as has been painted by certain American leftists. The government never interfered with the publication of the Communist daily in Chungking, for example, whereas in the so-called red capital of Yenan none other than their own party paper was ever tolerated. Besides this, other signs of

progress toward democracy were clearly discernible in Free China even during the last eight trying years.

1. The People's Political Council has been a highly successful political experiment in wartime China and an unmistakable step toward democratization. Created in 1938 and enlarged in subsequent years, it is now composed of 240 members fairly representative of the Chinese people and their varying shades of political opinion. Though not a legislative body, it has served the following purposes:

- a. discussing all important governmental policies,
- b. making proposals to the government,
- c. demanding and hearing reports from the government,
- d. investigating public offices at the request of the government.

Its most effective service has come in the form of criticising governmental corruption and in demanding the removal of inefficient personnel, thus vocalizing the wishes of the common people.

2. The liberalizing of the central government in the last two years has been another gratifying change in the direction of democracy. Many cabinet members and ministry officials in Chungking today are liberal intellectuals with American and British training. Many have been severe critics of the government and of the dominant party. As a challenge to them they have been given responsible posts to prove what they can do. The prospect of transferring democratic principles and practices from the Anglo-American countries looks bright—in fact, brighter than it has been for years.

3. Last but not least, credit is also due the Chinese Communists, who, in their struggle for power, have sought the support of the common people. They have long advertised that they are not Communists in the usual sense of the word but only agrarian reformers. They have advocated a betterment of the livelihood of the people. They have professed allegiance to the democratic principles of Sun Yat-Sen. They have in theory consented to the nationalizing of their army upon evidence that the Nationalist army has ceased to be a party organ.

They have clamored for the protection of individual rights and liberties. Whether they would resort to party dictatorship once they were in power is an open question which their greatest admirers in this country have not ventured to answer. Are the protestations of the Communists only an attempt to put up a political façade to win support and sympathy? I frankly don't know, but I do know that in politics a long-held façade may have to materialize into a reality. What the Communists have said in self-advertisement, whether sincere or no, will swing China toward democracy and not dictatorship.

These all were bits of progress during the war. The greatest step forward will be taken, as you know, on the 12th of November. On that day, the Constitution will be proclaimed and the National Congress will be elected. We shall not take time to examine in detail the provisions of the Chinese Constitution. Suffice it to say that learning amply from Britain, the United States and Switzerland, the Legislative Yuan has made the Chinese draft Constitution unique as regards governmental structure, providing for a strong head of state as President, and vesting the supreme governmental power in the National Congress of about 2,000 delegates to be elected from the counties, municipalities and special areas.

The proclamation of a constitution, despite its imperfections, the election of people to a national congress, the equal status enjoyed by all political parties — these are important landmarks along China's road to democracy, but the real test of democratizing China, as we will all agree, lies in the intelligence and integrity of the people. The greatest task in the democratization of China is therefore chiefly an educational one.

Considerable educational progress has been made in the last eight years in Free China despite the war, but the elementary school enrollment of eighteen million for last year is dismayingly small for a country with China's population. In addition, education in the invaded areas and especially in the Northeastern Provinces needs immediate remedy and disinfecting. Less than a month ago, an All-China educational confer-

ence was convened in Chungking in which the programs were planned and activated for the universalizing of elementary education for the whole population — the surest guarantee of increasing democracy for China.

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The third challenge that present day China is facing is that of industrialization. If China's past traditions have done a good deal to prepare her for constitutional democracy, they have done little as yet to start her on the road to industrialization, so that she will have to start from scratch.

In a country where the annual per capita consumption of coal is 150 pounds as against the United States figure of 8,000 pounds and Japan's of 1,000 pounds; where the annual per capita consumption of iron is 3 pounds as against 1,000 pounds in the United States and 150 pounds in pre-war Japan; where the annual per capita purchase of manufactured goods is estimated at fifty cents (U. S. currency) as against \$334 for the average American, the need for industrialization is obvious. Thus there is no shadow of doubt that China is to be industrialized.

We are interested in the "whither" of China's attempts at industrialization as something of extensive significance. The industrialization of a nation has at best only a neutral human value. Let us look at Japan. The great efficiency with which she succeeded in industrializing herself within fifty years was nothing short of a modern miracle, leaving a record in her chronicles of which her people may be justly proud. And yet are the Japanese of 1945 any happier than their ancestors in the year 1853? Or has the world been a happier place on account of Japan's industrialization? Is China going to gear her industrialization to a program of militaristic aggrandizement like Japan? Is she going to exploit her cheap labor to fatten a few capitalists and industrialists who will become helpless pawns in the game of the militarists for world conquest?

Although certain Americans have expressed great skepticism

as to China's ultimate objective in her industrialization program, we have seen writings on the wall everywhere in China that she is not going to step into Japan's shoes. Aside from the fact that China as a nation has not waged a single war of aggression for the last twelve centuries; aside from the repeated assurances China has given the world that she has absolutely no territorial ambitions, China's potentials for industrialization are quite limited in terms of natural resources and financial power so that international participation alone should provide one of the best safeguards against misuse of industrialization. China's coal deposit has been estimated at one-quarter of a trillion metric tons or one twenty-eighth of the world's total deposit, falling far behind the United States' share of three and one half trillion metric tons, the Soviet Union's reserve of one and one half trillion metric tons, or even Canada's one trillion metric tons. Our entrance into the atomic age, it may be argued, of course, will change the picture. Still that is not of immediate concern to industrialists in the non-Anglo-American world, for we trust the secret of the atomic bomb will not be released until the rest of the world is "absolutely safe" for democracy!

While I believe good sense and limited resources are safe checks against the militaristic industrialization of China, I do not mean to suggest that China's industrial future is gloomy. China is reasonably rich in her energy resources (even without the gigantic Yangtze dam), in iron and ferro-alloy metals, as well as in non-ferrous metals such as tin, mercury, antimony, and aluminum. There is every reason to believe that China should be able to build up an iron and steel industry comparable to that of pre-war Japan or even of Britain. With an adequate supply of machine tools, she can move on to the setting up of food, clothing, and other industries which utilize her agricultural products and will raise the living standards of her people.

The war has done so much damage to China's truly infant industries that large-scale acceleration is needed in many divergent fields. Fortunately the bitter experience acquired in war-

time has also taught the Chinese people certain valuable lessons. The long tradition of a dislike for machines as short-circuits of nature's mystery has now completely vanished. Many handicaps suffered have taught the people a new respect for precision. War has not only aroused the industrialist to patriotism but also encouraged the scientists in their work, and during the last seven years many minor inventions and improvements of practical value have come out of China's meagerly equipped laboratories and workshops. Natural resources in the interior, neglected in pre-war days have been surveyed and some are being developed. The Chinese people have become more industry-minded than ever before and have shown intelligent admiration for the American power of production which benefited the Chinese cause directly. All these augur well for China's industrial future because the efforts at industrialization will come from a broad basis of popular participation and support as well as from the apex of governmental planning, coordination and control.

According to the Central Planning Board, China's industrial planning will neither follow the Soviet pattern of state control nor the American pattern of laissez-faire free competition, but will try to strike a happy mean between the two. All planning and coordination will be directed by the government and a blue print is ready for distribution to guide industrialists and investors both at home and abroad. Transportation, communications and public utilities as well as all heavy industries are likely to be taken care of by the state, whereas enough room will be left open to private enterprise to promote economy, efficiency and the perpetual incentive to look for improvements. It is also noticeable that the Central Planning Board maintains a social welfare division so as to avoid as much as possible the repetition of some of the evils of early and current industrialism of the advanced areas.

It is almost superfluous to point out that international assistance is needed for carrying out even the initial stages of China's industrialization program. This need, stressed by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen himself a quarter of a century ago, is being re-

emphasized by government spokesmen as well as by economic and industrial leaders in China today.

As a huge amount of money is needed by China's first Five Year Plan—at least ten billion dollars in United States currency according to an estimate made recently by the Ministry of Economic Affairs—foreign capital is not only welcome, but to be encouraged. Taking communication needs alone, the Plan calls for 14,856 kilometers of railways, 130,464 kilometers of trunk and branch highways, 473 steamships totalling 1,500,000 tons, 93,200 kilometers of national and international airlines, 355,442 pair-kilometers of telegraph and telephone lines, 769 radio stations, and 69,310 additional post offices—all of which will involve a financial layout of over two billion dollars in United States currency.

China's inability to meet this demand for capital is self-evident. Besides her search for such indirect investments abroad as loans from foreign governments and international investment banks, and the sale in foreign markets of bonds and stocks, China will give every inducement to the attraction of direct foreign investments. With the abrogation of extra-territoriality the Chinese Government has liberalized its policy as regards foreign investments. There is now no restriction placed upon the percentage of foreign financial participation or personnel in the management of Chinese companies. Foreign nationals may, in conformity with Chinese laws, establish branch factories, branch business houses and independent business enterprises in China subject to no discrimination whatsoever as compared with Chinese nationals. Moreover, the Government is agreeable to granting special charters to foreign interests for undertaking important enterprises in China.

Besides foreign capital, China is looking forward to securing technical personnel from abroad. The large numbers of students being sent to this country and the British Isles for advanced training in schools, laboratories, and factories will meet only a small fraction of the urgent need. Technicians and specialists from abroad will therefore be welcome to go

to China not only to assist in the development and operation of industries in which foreign capital is invested, but also to participate in China's industrialization as government appointees or as private employees.

In other words, China is looking upon her rapid industrialization as something more than a purely national concern,—hence, something that will never develop into an international menace.

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This provides a natural transition to a brief discussion of another question, namely China's foreign policy. Is she going to play her role as a cooperative member of the United Nations, or is she to play one power against another as the Japanese diplomats have accused her. I do not need to be long-winded in answering this because you have not been misled by Japanese propaganda and already you have seen "something new under the sun." The Sino-Russian Treaty not only bespeaks the moderateness of Russian demands but also the readiness of the Chinese to pay for international amity. We decided to grant political independence to Mongolia, to share ownership of the Chinese Changchun Railroad, to share the use of Port Arthur as a naval base with the Soviet Union, and to open Dalien (Dairen) as a free port, because we do not fear the Russians but trust them as reasonable and realistic neighbors. We trust that they as well as we realize that a war between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic with the greatest land frontier among nations — of over 5,000 miles — will be endless and that if it ends (atomic bomb or no atomic bomb) no one will be victor. It was probably in view of the absolute necessity of friendly relations between the two nations that the Sino-Russian Treaty was concluded to last ten years longer than the Anglo-Russian or Franco-Russian Treaties.

The same spirit of forbearance and cooperation has been extended by China to other members of the United Nations with interests in the Orient. Between the United States and

China, there is no likelihood of any quarrel and let us hope there will be none. As regards the other metropolitan powers — Britain, France and the Netherlands, as you will doubtless recall, China has shown the same spirit of friendliness. To Britain, she has shown special consideration not only in having mobilized all Chinese emigrants in British areas for the British cause during the war, but also in withdrawing troops from Burma after the completion of the campaign, in agreeing to the transfer of Burma and Thailand from the China command to the Southeast Asia command, in withdrawing attempted mediation between Britain and India and in refraining from accepting Japan's surrender in Hong Kong, which has been an integral part of the China theater of war as specified by an inter-allied council.

The same is true of her relation with France. While accepting Japan's surrender in Indo-China, north of the 16th degree parallel, she has given repeated assurance to France that she doesn't want a single inch of territory not her own.

But China's situation will be difficult, for the whole of East Asia will keep changing after the war and will move in progressive directions. If we believe in the oneness of the world as the late Mr. Willkie so earnestly believed and like a major prophet so earnestly entreated us to translate that belief into action, we shall not doubt for a moment that even the "backward" peoples east of Suez will not tolerate a mere return to the status quo ante bellum.

Thus, postwar unrest is spreading all over the colonial areas in Southeast Asia, some developing into violent action as in French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies, especially Java; some marking time for direct action as in the British areas where armed forces of the paramount powers are at hand. Despite this superficial difference, the direction toward which the peoples of Southeast Asia are headed is unmistakable.

In French Indo-China when the Chinese marched in from the north and the British from the south to receive Japan's surrender, they found the country in revolt against the French. The Chinese were greeted in Hanoi by the flags of all the

United Nations except France, and by the news that an Indo-Chinese republic had been proclaimed. In the south when the British commanding officer, Major General Douglas Gracey moved into Saigon he found the Annamese nationalists on a rousing rampage, shooting up homes, burning the markets, seizing Frenchmen as hostages, ambushing every foreign party on the country roads moving toward the city. As a clumsy last resort, General Gracey made the grave tactical error of holding the Japanese troops responsible for maintaining order, keeping them armed to fight the Annamites.

Meanwhile similar news had reached the outside world from the Netherlands East Indies. There the nationalistic fever is also raging. A Republic of Indonesia had been proclaimed with the Dutch educated Soekarno as president. British Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christisen was warned on arrival that if he should bring along any Dutch troops, the Dutch would be shot. The General recommended they talk things over between themselves. Dutchmen everywhere roared in protest, branding Soekarno a puppet and a war criminal. The deadlock went on and according to the news received from Batavia this morning, Indonesia has declared war on the Netherlands.

All this time, the two paramount powers have shown great uncertainty as to what to do. They have put the blame on many parties (except, of course, themselves). The French accused the Japanese of having armed 60,000 Annamites and fanned them into open revolt. They suspected the Chinese of condoning, if not abetting, the fire of rebellion. They blamed the British for having bungled an easy task. Likewise the Netherlands deplored British duplicity and lack of judgment and declared that the independence movement was the mere continuation of a puppet show staged by the Japanese.

Despite their uncertainty, the paramount powers have realized some concessions to native demands might be necessary. Thus, the French have loosely talked of a semi-autonomous regime for a federated Indo-China in a French federal union. The Netherlands have reaffirmed the promise of

Queen Wilhelmina for Indonesian co-partnership in a Netherlands Commonwealth of Nations. To the indigenous peoples, these promises seem to have come too little and too late. While wooing seemed to be of no avail, the paramount powers were simultaneously trying out another old-time formula — that of cowing the dependent peoples into submission by the display, and if necessary, by the use of superior military force. Thus the French battleships, the *Richelieu* and the *Triomphant* have steamed into the harbor of Saigon, and the Netherlands are threatening to send 35,000 troops to bring about the reconquest of Indonesia.

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At this stage, any prediction as to the ultimate outcome of the struggle is of course, premature, but the general direction toward which the train of events will move in East Asia can be gauged by a recognition of the following facts:

1. The superiority of the white man is a thing of the past in Asia. The theory has been exploded by a number of factors: by American betrayal (as Europeans once charged) in preparing the Philippines for independence; by ignominious French surrender in Indo-China to Japan; by Japan's smashing victories in Southeast Asia; by allied propaganda against German and Japanese racism; by allied promise of freedom; and by Soviet assertions that they are predominantly an Asian people.

2. Moreover, the paramount powers have not done a sufficiently good job of shouldering the purported burden of the white man. None can deny their records are as a whole good (better than the records of the Japanese, for example), but still in the eyes of the indigenous peoples, not quite good enough. The progress in social and economic welfare has been meager and slow when measured by the standard of achievement attained in the so-called mother countries.

3. The paramount powers have unwittingly rendered the dependent peoples a great service — that of spreading the use of the European languages. Needed at first for the training of

civil service and commercial clerks, that knowledge has become a magic key in opening up a new universe of European humanism and liberalism, science and democracy. It is no mere coincidence that the leaders of Indo-Chinese and Indonesian nationalism have been French and Dutch university men respectively. By the same token, it is no surprise that a great number of leaders of the Swaraj movement in India are British trained lawyers. This makes it all the more difficult for Asian nationalists to reconcile themselves to the acceptance of repressive measures from the advanced democracies of Western Europe — from the home of the Magna Charta and the mother of parliamentarianism; from the land of the great revolution of '89 and the herald of liberty, equality and fraternity; or from the people who themselves once so heroically fought tyranny by pike and dyke.

4. The recent disturbances are genuine manifestations of a budding nationalism in East Asia and no aftermath of Japanese sabotage. In French Indo-China the revolutionary Party of young Annam was first organized in 1925. In 1929 terrorism was resorted to in the attempted assassination of Governor Pasquier which resulted in the death of Bazin — head of the Labor Bureau. When extensive arrests were made, it was found that half of the suspects were in government service. In the same year the army mutinied at Yenbey on the Red River and violence spread to the whole country. As a result of a second attempt on the life of Pasquier, the party was driven underground. The present Communist leader Nguen Ai Quoc, has been prominent since 1931 and definitely not merely a Japanese puppet.

The first signs of Javanese nationalism were seen as far back as 1864. By 1917 patriotic organizations which had pledged loyalty to the Netherlands had declared complete independence as their new goal. In 1918 even the temperate Insulinde party which had worked through the Volksraad had become so rebellious as to block the passage of a message of homage to the Queen. From 1920 on there were numerous outbursts of revolution and in 1927 the massive National

Indonesian Party was founded under the leadership of Soekarno at Bandoeng.

From these few scattered facts we can see that the desire for independence is only part of a great cosmic change taking place in the hearts and minds of men everywhere upon their entrance into a new era in history.

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But I am philosophizing, which I am not supposed to be doing. To tie it up with where we left off in China, what can the Chinese do? As I have suggested before, China is finding herself extremely embarrassed. Southeast Asia sees the imminent rise to nationhood of two peoples, the Mongols and the Filipinos, the resurrection of long vanquished Korea, and the gradual assumption of regional leadership by the once sub-colonial Chinese. Colonial Asians claim that what China, Korea, Mongolia and the Philippines can achieve they also can achieve ultimately. And no good citizen of any democracy can deny that claim and yet be able to read the preamble of the United Nations Charter with a clear conscience.

And yet, on the other hand, hasn't China promised her allies, the paramount powers, her friendly support and active cooperation in the ordering of the post-war world? Besides urging the paramount powers to speed up liberation, the earth-bound Chinese leaders are seeking guidance from a rather unearthly bit of ancient wisdom: namely, that the most effective way to help others to become good is to be good oneself. In accordance, China has not only promised independence to Mongolia upon confirmation by plebiscite, promised the French she has no territorial designs on Indo-China and stayed piously away from Hong Kong, but also made a startling announcement—that she is willing to pay other prices and make other sacrifices: that Tibet is entitled to preparation for independence; and Chiang Kai-Shek has made it clear that “if frontier racial groups situated in regions outside the provinces have the capacity for self-government and a strong

determination to attain independence, and are politically and economically ready for both, our Government should, in a friendly spirit, voluntarily help them as brotherly nations and as equals of China. We should entertain no ill will or prejudices against them because of their choice to leave the mother country." This is called the international second mile.

"But Tibet must give proof," continued President Chiang, "that it can consolidate its independent position and protect its continuity so as not to become another Korea."

"The direct and indirect casualties sustained by our expeditionary forces in the Burma campaigns amounted to more than 200,000. Our hope is that Indo-China will be autonomous and eventually become independent in accordance with the provisions of the Atlantic Charter. Our foreign policy is to honor treaties, rely upon law, and seek rational readjustments when the requirements of time and actual conditions demand such readjustments."

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In discussing the future of East Asia we must not fail to point out the importance of America's share in the shaping of Asia's destiny. Despite the increasing power of the Soviet Union in the politics of attraction, despite the new position China has attained, the United States is still wielding the greatest influence in East Asia and a great deal of the question of whither China and East Asia depends on American attitudes, policies and actions. In Asia, and especially in China, confidence in the integrity of the American people has not been dampened by the peculiar position taken by their delegates in the trusteeship commission at the San Francisco Conference, or even by your refusal to release the secrets of the atomic bomb. American good will, fair play, and practical wisdom are yet, we feel, the most effective means to get the family of nations a step onward to the Confucian ideal of the Great Commonwealth in which the great way shall prevail.

"When the great way prevails, the world is a common state.

Officers are elected according to their wisdom and ability, mutual confidence and harmonious relations are cultivated, so that people regard not only their own parents as parents and not only their own children as children. The young are able to employ their talents; the juniors are free to grow; the helpless widows, the lonely orphans, the crippled and the deformed are well provided for, men have their occupations and women have their homes. While not to be wasted, wealth is kept not necessarily as personal property; while not to be penned up in idleness, energy is exerted not necessarily for personal profit. Thus scheming and intrigue cease to exist; banditry and violence do not arise. As a result outer doors always remain wide open. This is the age of the Great Commonwealth."



